B o o k R e v i e ws
Today's medical marketplace is mostly a judicial creation. In the 1980s the U.S. Supreme Court's market-oriented readings of the law governing employees' fringe benefits created hothouse conditions for the growth of managed care. The Justices-and compliant lower courts-construed this law to broadly preempt state authority over the content and administration of health insurance benefits. In the early 1990s the courts read this preemption to immunize managed health plans from state lawsuits for denial of care.
The federal law at issue, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), was conceived without medical care in mind. Enacted almost thirty years ago, when health insurers paid passively for whatever the doctor ordered, it imposed no substantive duties on health plans. Through the mid-1990s the industry enjoyed extraordinary freedom from regulatory constraint and legal accountability. More recently, though, the legal tradewinds have changed. At first cryptically, then more clearly, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled its intent to reverse course on ERISA preemption and to permit the states to reassert legal authority over the health care sphere. The states have done so, with a vengeance.
Strangers in the Night tells the story of the managed care industry's early success and subsequent failures at resisting regulation. Peter Jacobson enriches this story with discussion of how the different perspectives of medicine and law complicate legal governance and conflict management in the health sphere. The great strength of Jacobson's book is that it renders this complex story accessible to readers concerned about health care policy but unfamiliar with the law; its greatest flaw is that it tries to do too much. In 270 pages, Jacobson offers a crash course in basic legal concepts, the economics of managed care, the convolutions of ERISA, and the sources of misunderstanding between practitioners of medicine and law. He then proposes his own approach to health care law's central dilemma: the tension between individual need and stewardship of limited social resources. His inventive proposal, which ought to be a must-read for judges, health lawyers, and policymakers, is at risk of getting lost amid material meant as a primer for readers unfamiliar with the workings of managed care and the basics of American law.
I confess that I do not speak to Jacobson's work from a disinterested perspective. We have been coauthors, and we collaborated on an amicus brief for the U.S. Supreme Court in Pegram v. Herdrich, highlighting the problem of role conflict when physicians act as both clinical caretakers and health plan gatekeepers. Thus, I warm to his plea to policymakers and the courts to take the professional ethic of fidelity to patients more seriously than most have so far. Delegating utilization management to treating physicians, then rewarding them fi-nancially for restricting care, raises a host of issues that regulation skeptics tend to disregard. A market-driven health care system can and should make space for professional fidelity to patients-and for the human needs that long ago gave rise to this ethic.
Jacobson proposes a way of doing so. He urges judges to build upon the common law concept of fiduciary duty, which requires actors to abjure pursuit of economic self-interest when they enter into contractual relationships with people ill-situated to assess the quality of contractual performance. The law imposes fiduciary duties on trust fund managers, corporate directors, attorneys, and physicians, on the grounds that trust beneficiaries, shareholders, clients, and patients lack the knowledge required to reward and punish contractual performance. By nurturing trust in situations that invite skepticism, fiduciary obligations open possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange that would not otherwise occur.
These duties require actors to refrain from self-dealing at beneficiaries' expense, and they are thus well matched to situations in which beneficiaries have common interests. As Jacobson concedes, though, the concept of fiduciary duty does not by itself provide answers when beneficiaries have competing interests. Fiduciary norms oblige trustees and directors, fund managers, and others to be prudent stewards of the financial commons, but they do not speak to the question of how resources should be divided when people's conflicting needs are matters of administrative discretion.
Jacobson's answer is that robust affirmation of fiduciary rules against financial advantage taking can lay a foundation for public trust in payers' exercise of discretion. Conflicts of obligation-to individual patients versus the risk pool-are inevitable, but conflicts of interest are not. Cost containment, he reluctantly concedes, requires that beneficial care be withheld. Yet neither utilization reviewers nor gatekeeping clinicians should be influenced by monetary rewards for denying care. Beyond this, Jacobson proposes that payers narrow their discretion as judges do, by giving reasons for utilization management decisions, aiming for consistency in these decisions, and making their reasons accessible to clinicians and consumers.
Might this blend of fiduciary obligation, transparency, and procedural due process be the antidote to Americans' skepticism about managed care? It is worth trying. The Supreme Court's reversal on ERISA preemption presents the states with an opportunity for doing so. Laws in more than forty states mandating that independent medical review of coverage denials be available ensure a measure of due process. The Supreme Court's decision last June, in Moran v. Rush-Prudential HMO, put these laws out of ERISA's preemptive reach and cleared the way for more robust state regulation of managed care. But the Court's curious doctrinal route-treatment of medical review as more akin to a doctor's "second opinion" than to a legal proceeding-limits independent review's potential as a tool for transforming utilization management into a process marked by reason giving, transparency, and consistency.
Moreover, as Jacobson notes, courts have been reluctant to limit financial incentives under the rubric of fiduciary duty, and they have shown mixed willingness to require that such incentives be disclosed. Meanwhile, in response to market pressures, health care payers are now moving away from aggressive utilization management and financial rewards for frugal practice. Higher copayments and deductibles are the current cost containment fashion. It may be premature to proclaim, as some have, the "death of managed care," but conflict over the industry's cost-control methods could fade without being resolved.
Should this happen, judges will still have much to say about health care. They are America's health policymakers of last resort, called upon to manage our contradictory demands for limits on spending and limitless access. Jacobson's book offers lawyers and judges an opportunity to better understand the things that health care litigants quarrel about. It is also an invaluable resource for providers and policymakers who want to better understand the law's stylized, sometimes mystifying treatment of these quarrels.
